PORAT FINAL ARTICLE

12/28/2009 10:55 AM

The Plural Implications of Value
Pluralism: A Comment on Maimon
Schwarzschild’s On This Side of the Law
and On That Side of the Law

IDDO PORAT*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 909
VALUE PLURALISM AND FEDERALISM ................................................................ 911
VALUE PLURALISM AND GAY MARRIAGE ........................................................... 915
VALUE PLURALISM AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ..................................................... 917
VALUE PLURALISM AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
THREE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS ......................................................................... 919
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 924

I. INTRODUCTION
In his paper, On This Side of the Law and On That Side of the Law,
Professor Schwarzschild neatly and convincingly presents the thesis that
Isaiah Berlin’s central idea—value pluralism—can support opposing
views on a variety of legal and public policy issues. Value pluralism is
the idea that there is a plurality of values in human experience, and that
they cannot be reduced to one overarching value or principle. Professor
Schwarzschild reviews four strongly debated legal and public policy
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issues—the state action doctrine, judicial activism, gay marriage, and
federalism—and shows that value pluralism can be used to argue either
for or against each of these issues.
Beginning with state action, Professor Schwarzschild shows that one
can use the idea of value pluralism to argue for state action because
without it we would subject individuals—and not only the state—to the
monolithic power of judicially enforced rights, thus limiting the plurality
of possibilities in private life. But, on the other hand, one can use the
same idea of value pluralism to argue against state action because it
allows private actors to discriminate against others, thus limiting value
pluralism in society. As for judicial activism, it is antipluralistic by
subjecting states, courts, and legislatures to the monolithic interpretation
of the Constitution by the Supreme Court; but, like state action, it is
propluralistic by eradicating discriminatory practices that hinder
pluralism in society. Gay marriage is pluralistic in allowing more people
to choose freely their type of family association, but it is antipluralistic
because it endangers the traditional conception of marriage, thus
reducing the plurality of values in society. And federalism enhances
pluralism by allowing states to choose their own values; at the same
time, it hinders pluralism by immunizing states from central government
review of their antipluralistic practices and laws.
Although Professor Schwarzschild is careful not to take sides with any
one of the opposing possible interpretations of pluralism in each of these
examples, he does not go so far as taking the radical view that pluralism
can support any position on any issue—a view that would make
pluralism an empty concept. On the other hand, his project is also not
one of a Berlin exegesis, that is, one of finding out what Berlin had in
mind when he used the idea of value pluralism. Rather, the reader is
pressed to read between the lines and within the careful discussion finds
hints to the author’s own views and normative preference regarding the
implication of value pluralism.
I suggest that there are two main views that can be found in Professor
Schwarzschild’s paper. The first is a strong suspicion of any type of
centralized power, especially judicial power, as potentially stifling the
plurality of values in society and imposing a monolithic view from
above. This theme makes federalism and judicial activism especially
central issues in the paper, and I will concentrate on both of them in my
comment.
The second view regarding the application of value pluralism is more
subtle. It is a Burkean defense of traditional institutions, arguing that
they represent a way of life in danger of extinction in the face of generic
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and prevalent rationalism.1 Value pluralism should induce us to protect
such traditions from extinction. This theme is manifested in the discussion of
gay marriage and represents a conservative and traditionalist strand of
value pluralism. The two themes can be related according to a view
promoting state autonomy as a safe haven against an attempt to subject
the variety of tradition-based experiences to the homogeneous effect of
rationalism.
In what follows, I will concentrate on these two themes and point out
several challenges to Professor Schwarzschild’s application of them,
starting with a discussion of federalism, moving on to gay marriage, and
ending with a discussion of judicial activism, which I will also expand
into my own argument on three different ways in which value pluralism
can be applied to judicial review adjudication.
II. VALUE PLURALISM AND FEDERALISM
As noted, Professor Schwarzschild’s main thesis in the paper is that
value pluralism can both support and oppose central doctrines and
policies. This is well exemplified in his discussion of federalism. Professor
Schwarzschild argues that value pluralism supports federalism because
in a federal system “the various state or provincial governments have
considerable freedom to adopt their own values and policies, which will
differ from time to time and from place to place.”2 However, value
pluralism rejects federalism to the extent that federalism can be invoked
in the defense of discriminatory practices by states because such
practices would limit pluralism within those states. In particular, he
alludes to the way the concept of federalism was used to defend
segregation and discrimination in the South during the time of the civil
rights movement by arguing that they reflected the South’s “way of
life.”3
Although Professor Schwarzschild has an evenhanded approach to
these two opposing implications of the concept of value pluralism on the
idea of federalism, it is quite evident that the thrust of his argument is to
defend federalism as pluralist, despite its questionable past during the
civil rights movement. His argument is that we should not throw the
1.
2.

See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
Maimon Schwarzschild, On This Side of the Law and On That Side of the Law,
46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 755, 766 (2009).
3. Id. at 758.
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baby out with the bath water, or in his words, “the sorry history of racial
segregation ought not to discredit federalism in principle.”4 The
sophisticated treatment of federalism that runs as a major theme in the
paper is one of its strongest and more convincing aspects.
There are, however, two points that I would like to make with regard
to Professor Schwarzschild’s argument on federalism. First, one major
justification for federalism is not based on value pluralism and may even
be antithetical to it. The “laboratory” justification for federalism, according
to which states “may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments,”5 is based on the analogy of an experiment. This
analogy, in turn, presupposes the existence of one “true” answer that the
experiment would expose, rather than a plurality of “truths” that coexist
together. Therefore, according to the laboratory justification for federalism,
pluralism is not a state of affairs that is good in and of itself. Rather we
may opt for pluralism as a means for finding out the right solution to the
question that we are testing, but once this solution is found, states would
hopefully coalesce with it and pluralism will cease to exist.6
A similar argument is used for justifying the principle of free speech,
according to the “marketplace of ideas” justification for free speech.
“[R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection,”7 maintained
Judge Learned Hand, and Justice Holmes famously wrote that “the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”8 Because we can never know which ideas
are correct, so the argument goes, we should test them in the marketplace of
ideas, and the ideas that turn out victorious in a free competition will be
the most likely to be the true ones. As with the laboratory argument for
federalism, according to the marketplace of ideas argument for free
speech, the pluralism of ideas is not an end in itself but only a means to
get to the one true answer.
The second point regarding federalism and value pluralism relates to
Professor Schwarzschild’s argument that it supports discrimination,
which is averse to value pluralism. The reasons why discrimination is

4. Id. at 768.
5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85–88 (1995) (supporting
the justification of federalism under the “laboratory” model); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1498–500 (1987).
7. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
8. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73–77 (1960).
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averse to pluralism are stated earlier in the paper in the context of state
action:
There was not much pluralism altogether about racial mores at the time: segregation
and discrimination were depressingly uniform in America, almost monolithically so
in the South. The pluralist argument for Shelley and the ensuing civil rights
decisions is that they helped to crack the monolith and to expand freedom. Civil
rights emancipated black Americans and in a sense everyone; and more freedom
means more freedom of choice and hence more pluralism in practice.9

This passage gives two reasons why discrimination is antipluralistic:
first, that discrimination represented a monolithic view in the South, and
second, that it limited the freedom of black Americans. I would like to
question both of these reasons.
Regarding the first reason, it seems to me that the problem with
discrimination was not only, or even primarily, that it reflected a
monolithic view in society. Suppose that we found out that discrimination
against blacks was strongly debated in the South and represented only
one out of many worldviews—would this fact make it more justifiable?
And conversely, suppose racial equality becomes the dominant and even
the monolithic doctrine in the South, as it hopefully is today—would
that in any way subject it to suspicion or criticism?
This discussion reflects a more general tension within Professor
Schwarzschild’s argumentation and within the discussion on value
pluralism in general—a tension between a substantive or positive
conception of value pluralism and a procedural or negative one.10 The
positive conception consists of the idea that a plurality of ideas is a good
state of affairs in and of itself and should be positively promoted, while a
uniformity of ideas is bad in and of itself and should be discouraged. On
the other hand, the negative or procedural conception of pluralism
focuses on removing formal restrictions against value pluralism, or
formal impositions of a monolithic and orthodox view. According to the
procedural conception, if, lacking formal restriction on pluralism,
society freely chooses to be homogenous, this in itself is not bad, or at
least not inconsistent with value pluralism. To my mind, Professor
Schwarzschild’s discussion of discrimination reveals some of the

9. Schwarzschild, supra note 2, at 758.
10. This distinction is not to be confused with another important distinction—that
between negative and positive liberty and the ensuing discussion over which of them is
implied by value pluralism. For this distinction, see generally GEORGE CROWDER,
LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 86–90 (2002).
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difficulties of the first conception of value pluralism. While we may
assign an instrumental value to value pluralism or find it indicative of a
free society, it seems harder to defend a view that would promote
diversity and pluralism in and of themselves. Such a view would seem
to suggest a very problematic conclusion that, all other things being equal, a
society that includes both racial equality and racial discrimination viewpoints
is better than a society that has only racial equality viewpoints.11
As to the second reason why discrimination is antipluralistic, namely,
that it limited the freedom of black Americans, the question in terms of
value pluralism should not only be whether it restricted their freedom
and hence the total amount of freedom and choice in American society,
which it did, but whether it also restricted the plurality of views and
values in American society. There is a strong contention that it did that
too, but I would like to mention here the fact that discrimination is not
necessarily connected to the restriction of values and worldviews, just as
freedom is not necessarily connected to the enhancement of the plurality
of worldviews in society.12 The problem with making such an association
is that it requires the persons or groups that are being discriminated
against to associate themselves with a certain identity or way of life in
order for them to claim discrimination. But consider, for example,
discrimination based on disability, age, or gender—is the way of life,
ideology, or values of the disabled, the old, or women implied by the
very idea of discrimination against them? Must we assume that they
have such a particular identity and way of life that we want to protect in
order for us to understand the concept of discrimination against them
and in order to know that it is wrong? Must we engage in a discussion
of what exactly is the disabled identity, the elderly identity, the female
identity, or the black identity, for that matter, in order to understand and
evaluate discrimination against the disabled, the old, women, and
blacks? For discrimination to operate, all that is needed is the concept of
unequal treatment based on irrational reasons, such as bias or prejudice
11. Even those associating value pluralism with the “ethic of diversity,” such as
George Crowder, would usually wish to put some constraints on the ideal of diversity:
The maximizing dimension of the ethic of diversity must be supplemented by a
second kind of consideration, that of balance or coherence among the values to
be promoted. Sheer multiplication of different goods must be tempered by attention
to the content of those goods and to the relations among them, since some may
impede others. The diversity implied by pluralism is therefore best understood
as involving both a quantitative and a qualitative element, both a requirement
of a generous range of values and a requirement that the values within that range
should be tolerably coherent with one another. The ethic of diversity embraces
both “multiplicity” and “coherence.”
Id. at 139.
12. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8 (arguing that free speech can result in
a monolithic view).
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or animus. Discrimination against blacks is wrong regardless of the fact
that it has also diminished the access of black values into American
society and deprived it of black worldviews.13
III. VALUE PLURALISM AND GAY MARRIAGE
One of the more thought provoking arguments in Professor
Schwarzschild’s paper is that the acceptance of gay marriage can be
viewed as inconsistent with value pluralism. At first sight, this is
surprising because, as Professor Schwarzschild himself notes, allowing
more people more choices for marriage seems to enhance value
pluralism rather than reduce it. However, his argument is that there is
also an antipluralistic tendency in gay marriage:
Gay marriage might not expand human choice so much as it would tend to
substitute a new ethos for the old one—an ethos in which marriage no longer means
what it used to mean. . . . To preserve marriage in something like its traditional
form, from a value pluralist point of view, is to preserve an institution whose
values are at odds with the main currents of modern life: currents dominated by
free choice and free contract, by mobility, by innovation, by reason, or by what
Max Weber called “rationalization.”14

Gay marriage is antipluralistic, therefore, because it causes an old way
of life to become extinct, thus reducing the plurality of values in society.
This idea rings familiar and reminds us of the words of the eighteenthcentury English philosopher, Edmund Burke, that “[w]hen ancient
opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be
estimated.”15 But this argument is still perplexing. After all, by losing one
way of life, we gain another—a modern one. Why is it that substituting
old values for new values makes for less value pluralism, rather than just
for the shifting of values in society? Obviously, as in the case of
discrimination, this cannot be explained solely by the fact that the old
ideas are now unpopular and no longer hegemonic. Presumably, Professor
Schwarzschild would not have objected to traditional marriage even at
the time it was hegemonic and reflected a monolithic view in society.

13. Cf. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833,
834–45 (2001).
14. Schwarzschild, supra note 2, at 763.
15. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790),
reprinted in 24 T HE H ARVARD C LASSICS 143, 215 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1937),
available at http://www.bartleby.com/24/3/.
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However, the main thrust of Professor Schwarzschild’s ideas is
revealed once we notice the other Burkean strand that is imbedded in
them—the emphasis on the homogenizing effect of reason, rationalism,
and utilitarianism. Utilitarianism and rationalism are at odds not only
with traditional ways of life but also with the idea of value pluralism
itself because they provide the overarching idea under which all other
ideas must be subsumed and according to which all other values can be
commensurate. Like economic review, which has inherited utilitarianism
and rationalism in current legal and public discourse, utilitarianism and
rationalism seem to do away with all irrational customs and traditions,
on their way to subjecting the entire spectrum of human values and
experience to the single test of reason and utility.16
The following words from Burke’s famous book Reflections on the
Revolution in France reflect very similar ideas to those of Professor
Schwarzschild. Rejecting rationalism as “this barbarous philosophy,
which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings, and
which is as void of solid wisdom as it is destitute of all taste and
elegance,”17 Burke, in beautiful prose, laments the fact that:
[N]ow all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle
and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which,
by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify
and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of
light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the
superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which
the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects
of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation,
are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.18

The traditional ways of life must bow to the homogenizing specter of
reason, and human experience seems to shrink down to the single
measure of reason.
Note however that this interpretation of value pluralism is decidedly a
traditionalist and conservative one, and not necessarily the one with
which Berlin would have sided. Although he would definitely have
sided with the rejection of reductive rationalism and utilitarianism,
Berlin would have probably shirked away from some of the more

16. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 784 (1994) (“Different kinds of valuation cannot without significant loss be reduced
to a single ‘superconcept,’ like happiness, utility, or pleasure. Any such reduction produces
significant loss because it yields an inadequate description of our actual valuations when
things are going well.” (footnote omitted)). For a similar criticism of the Law and Economics
movement, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique
of (A Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997).
17. BURKE, supra note 15, at 214.
18. Id. at 213–14.
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coercive aspects of traditionalism and conservatism. After all, it is not
pluralism in and of itself that guides traditionalism; not all ideas are
welcomed under traditionalism but only those ideas that have passed the
test of time and have been ingrained into long-standing institutions.
Only those ideas and institutions that represent the accumulated reason
of generations are those that should be revered and protected. This may
very well come at the expense of value pluralism if value pluralism
means threatening those institutions and traditions.
IV. VALUE PLURALISM AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Moving on to judicial activism, Professor Schwarzschild argues that
judicial activism promotes pluralism because it prohibits discriminatory
practices, but that it is antithetical to pluralism because “[c]onstitutional
adjudication, in particular, tends to impose a single, almost unchangeable
standard across the country. . . . [O]nly one judicial interpretation can
prevail, at least in principle, at any given time.”19 Having more
constitutional adjudication would mean fewer decisions by lower courts,
which are more diversified and plural than those of the Supreme Court,
and also fewer decisions by legislatures and executive bodies, which are
similarly more varied and plural than the Supreme Court.
However, the extent to which constitutional adjudication would
produce more uniformity and less pluralism may vary depending on
several factors. It may depend, for example, on whether constitutional
adjudication is conducted through rules or through standards. Rules are
deemed to be a more effective means of control over lower courts and
would therefore promote more uniformity within the judicial system.20
But some constitutional decisions are conducted through standards,
which empower lower courts and exert less control over them. The
Court periodically shifts between rules and standards, and there may be
differences between rule-based and standard-based adjudication within a
single Court depending on the Justice writing the opinion and on the area
of law.21
19. Schwarzschild, supra note 2, at 759.
20. See Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control,
23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 328 (2007).
21. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 41 (1999); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379,
393–94 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 69 (1992).
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In addition, the tendency toward applying rules or standards in the
highest court’s adjudication may change across countries. As Professor
Schwarzschild points out, the American judicial system is unique in
having a small Supreme Court with a very small docket exerting control
over a vast system of lower courts both state and federal.22 This feature
of the American judiciary favors relatively clear and stable rules rather
than standards as a means of effective control because control over the
lower courts on a case-by-case basis through standards is impracticable.
Other judicial systems that are smaller and more manageable may opt
for more standards rather than more rules as the need for control is less
acute. A similar argument has been made as to why American free
speech jurisprudence is rule driven while the Canadian one is more
standard driven.23
In some other legal systems, there may also be cases in which the
highest court is big and diverse enough to allow for value pluralism within
the court itself or in which it shares its finality with other courts—such
as the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights
with relation to the supreme courts of European countries—while other
decisionmaking processes, such as the legislative and the executive, may
turn out to be more monolithic and unchanging.
Finally, on a more principled level, one can question whether the idea
of value pluralism is at all acceptable as a guiding ideal for legal
interpretation. Do we really want to have varied and different
interpretations for each legal or constitutional provision, at each point of
time? Value pluralism, as applied to legal interpretation, seems to
conflict with another central principle—the rule of law—according to
which law should be clear and stable so that people can direct their
behavior according to it. The rule of law is contradictory to the rule of
men, which would be the case if law would allow for pluralistic and
individualized interpretations rather than establish a stable and central
one.

22. Schwarzschild, supra note 2, at 759–60. The American Supreme Court issues
less than a hundred decisions per year and exerts control over a judicial system that
serves a population of more than 300 million people. See, e.g., The Statistics, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 516, 516 (2008). In comparison, the Israeli Supreme Court issues more than
6000 decisions per year, and exerts control over a judicial system that serves more than
7 million people. See Guy E. Carmi, A Constitutional Court in the Absence of a Formal
Constitution? On the Ramifications of Appointing the Israeli Supreme Court as the Only
Tribunal for Judicial Review, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 67, 86–87 (2005).
23. See Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional
Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 67, 77 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006)
(noting that prosecution decisions are made by a more centralized authority in Canada
and Great Britain than in the United States and therefore there is a greater risk of leaving
decisions to prosecutors without clear guiding rules).
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Professor Schwarzschild seems therefore to make an important and
convincing argument with regard to judicial review in the context of his
argument on federalism in the United States, that is, as another
manifestation of his argument that the states should be able to have their
own laws, free from a centrally imposed monolithic view of the federal
government. But, viewed as an argument for judicial review and judicial
activism in general, it may encounter several difficulties.
V. VALUE PLURALISM AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
THREE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
I will devote the rest of my comment to suggesting an additional
account of the possible implications of value pluralism to judicial
activism and judicial review. This account will depart from Professor
Schwarzschild’s discussion but will touch upon it at several junctions.
I would like to suggest three possible implications of value pluralism
in terms of judicial activism and judicial review. The first implication is
the rejection of absolutism and formalism in favor of a contextual and
balancing approach to legal and constitutional interpretation. Faced with
the recognition that conflict among values is inevitable and omnipresent,
and that the variety of societal values should be acknowledged and
respected, judiciaries around the world come to the conclusion that a
judge should not give absolute or categorical preference to any one value
at the expense of all the other values. A judge should rather strive to
reflect the plurality of values in her decisions, by giving voice to all of
the possible values and worldviews in society and balancing between
them to the best of her abilities, in accordance with the particular
circumstances of the case. Value pluralism therefore connotes judicial
balancing.24
Two strands of the balancing approach can be regarded as an
implication of value pluralism. The first emphasizes the pragmatic
necessity of balancing as a conclusion drawn from value pluralism.
Because social conflict cannot cease to be, and the attempt to find an
absolute or overarching principle that would do away with such conflict
24. For the documentation of the spread of the contextual and balancing approach
around the globe in the context of a value pluralist worldview, see DAVID M. BEATTY,
THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159, 171–76 (2004). See also David S. Law, Generic
Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 693–95 (2005); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud
Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 73–74 (2008).
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is futile, it is the task of judiciaries to balance the different interests and
values in society in an attempt to accommodate and reconcile them.
This strand dates back to the pragmatist movement’s rejection of
absolutism in legal and philosophical thinking early in the twentieth
century and is expressed in the work of the legal Progressives such as
Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo.25 Roscoe Pound, for example,
explained, “I do not believe the jurist has to do more than recognize the
problem . . . presented to him as one of securing all social interest so far
as he may, of maintaining a balance or harmony among them that is
compatible with the securing of all of them.”26
The second strand is symbolic and expressive in nature and seems to
be a more recent phenomenon. It contends that the judicial decision
should express respect to each of the values involved in it by giving
voice to each and by making sure that no value or interest is left out of
the judicial balance. This expressive function also accounts for attempts
to frame the judicial decision as a compromise between conflicting
worldviews—a golden path between them—reflecting societal consensus
rather than societal extremes.
Professor Paul Kahn identified such a tendency in the jurisprudence of
Justice Lewis Powell and termed it “representative balancing.” “The
appeal of representative balancing,” argued Kahn, “is its requirement
that the Justice regulate that competition among interests by reference to
the value of pluralism, of openness to all factions.”27 Such balancing
“aims to give voice to each interest by setting forth a rule that
accommodates all of them. Ideally, that rule allows each interest its
maximum realization consistent with recognition of and respect for other
competing interests.”28
Justice Powell’s most famous decision, University of California v.
Bakke, is a good example of this line of pluralism-based balancing
approach.29 In Bakke, concerning affirmative action in university
admittance policies, Justice Powell contraposed the value of “color
blindness” with the value of “affirmative action” and reached a
compromise that seems to give voice to both: affirmative action would
be allowed, but only through an individualized review of applicants
25. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (arguing that Justice Holmes
represented another view with regards to the implication of value pluralism).
26. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 96 (1922).
Pound also asserted that the judicial function should be that of “weighing or balancing of
the various interests which overlap or come in conflict and a rational reconciling or adjustment.”
Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943).
27. Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1987).
28. Id. at 5.
29. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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rather than through quotas.30 Justice Powell thus showed respect for
each of the values implicated in his decision and framed his decision as
one that accommodated both and retained the essence of each. It is only
fitting that the one value that he did adopt wholeheartedly in his decision
was the quintessential pluralistic value of “diversity.”31
However, the balancing approach as an implication of value
pluralism—whether of the pragmatic or the expressive kind—faces the
following objection: why should the Court be in charge of harmonizing
and accommodating the clashes of values in society, rather than the
elected bodies of government? Do not these elected bodies reflect the
actual compromises that society has reached at a given point in time?
Do we not elect these bodies exactly for that purpose—to make
decisions with regard to the proper balance of interests and values? The
recognition of value pluralism may therefore lead a court to a conclusion
regarding judicial activism and judicial review that is diametrically
opposed to the one arrived at by the balancing approach. Out of
recognition of the plurality of values, a court may conclude that it should
not intervene at all in the play of values and interests in society reflected
by the democratic process. Instead, it may opt for judicial neutrality,
and in turn for judicial deference, to the decision of the elected bodies of
government.
This second implication of value pluralism to judicial review reflects a
more skeptical approach than that of balancing. It considers that values
are incommensurable in a strong sense, so any compromise or
reconciliation would become impossible. Therefore, any attempt at
compromise would be a judicial imposition of one value over another in
the guise of a neutral compromise. The only place to decide between
such conflicts would be in the battleground of democratic competition
rather than in court through any rational attempt at reconciliation.
This view may be most clearly associated with the jurisprudence of
Justice Holmes. Professor Grey argues that:

30.
31.

Id. at 316–18.
Id. at 313.
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Holmes did not believe there was any rational metric for balancing one [policy]
against the other. For him, competing policies represented a split in the community,
whose different portions “want different things,” and, in the absence of
a legislative resolution based on counting heads or registering the dominance of
one group over another, these conflicting wants were incommensurable.32

In terms of constitutional adjudication and judicial review, this strand
of skeptical pluralism led Justice Holmes to his famous emphasis on
judicial deference, captured most succinctly in his dissent in Lochner:
“[A Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views,
and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution
of the United States.”33
Justice Holmes’s follower in the Court, Justice Frankfurter, similarly
combined respect for different and contradicting worldviews and societal
interests with a strong sense of judicial deference and belief that clashes
of interests should be decided through the political rather than the
judicial process. Discussing the conflict between free speech and
national security, involved in Dennis v. United States, Frankfurter noted:
But how are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not subject to
quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into asking, who
is to make the adjustment?—who is to balance the relevant factors and ascertain
which interest is in the circumstances to prevail? Full responsibility for the
choice cannot be given to the courts. . . .
Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the situation
before us of necessity belongs to the Congress.34

A third approach to judicial review as an implication of value pluralism
comes out of an attempt to reconcile the two former approaches.
Process Theory, which developed as a response to the theory of
complete judicial deference—even in cases such as Dennis—allows for
some judicial activism on the one hand but, on the other hand, restricts it
to the protection of the democratic process. Associated primarily with
the work of Professor John Hart Ely,35 but originating much earlier in the
famous Carolene Products footnote,36 Process Theory seems to be
32. Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in Theory and
Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 36 (1995).
33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
35. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1980).
36. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For another
precursor of the Process Theory, see generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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motivated by the same skeptical strand of value pluralism that motivated
judicial deference and by the same recognition that, in principle, clashes
of values and interests should be resolved by the legislature rather than
by the judiciary. However, unlike the judicial deference approach,
Process Theory allocates a special function to the judiciary in regulating
the democratic process and in maintaining that it does indeed reflect the
plurality of values in society. Therefore, judicial review would be more
justifiable when the rights in view are those that pertain to the
democratic process itself or enhance the participation of marginalized
groups in that process, such as the rights of free speech and equal
protection.
Among these three approaches, it would seem that Professor
Schwarzschild’s views align most closely with the third one—judicial
process. This approach fits his criticism of judicial activism in general as
limiting the free play of values in society, as well as his acknowledgment of
its role in addressing discrimination and governmental censorship, which
themselves limit the free play of values in society. Indeed Professor
Schwarzschild cites favorably to the Carolene Products footnote as
manifesting the application of value pluralism to judicial activism.37
To conclude this part, I would like to attempt to apply the Process
Theory approach to judicial review to the question of gay marriage,
which Professor Schwarzschild discussed in his paper.38 Professor
Schwarzschild did not address this issue directly, as he only discussed
the implications of gay marriage on value pluralism and did not address
the question whether gay marriage legislation should be reviewed by the
Court. I would like to suggest that, according to the Process Theory, gay
marriage should not be among the issues that would justify the
subjection of the democratic process to the second-guessing of the
Court. This is so because, unlike legislation that limits the rights of
minorities and marginalized groups in society and hence is suspect of
reflecting a bias in the democratic process, legislation that would allow
gay marriage promotes the rights of a minority and a marginalized group
in society—the gay community—and therefore is not suspect of
originating from such a bias. It would seem that Process Theory would
suggest that, in such cases, the decision should be left to the democratic
process and to the majorities reflected in legislative decisions.

37.
38.

Schwarzschild, supra note 2, at 762 & nn.23–24.
Id. at 762–64.
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A similar argument was made in a recent Israeli case concerning the
exemption given to ultraorthodox men and women from military
service.39 In a concurring opinion, Justice Grunis specifically cited to
Ely’s Process Theory in order to maintain that because the case
represented the promotion of minority rights and interests by the
majority, rather than their limitation, it is not a suspect case that should
give rise to a high level of judicial scrutiny, and the judiciary should
leave the matter to the democratic process.40
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Schwarzschild’s thoughtful paper provides a rich platform
for the discussion of the plural implications of value pluralism, which
has also been the center of this comment. Whatever those implications
are, one phenomenon seems to rise clearly out of the discussion—the
pervasiveness and wide acceptance of Berlin’s idea of value pluralism in
legal discourse and legal theory. Ironically maybe, but also fortunately,
Berlin’s value pluralism has almost attained the status of a monolithic
view in legal discourse.

39. HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov’t v. Knesset [2006] (not yet
reported) (upholding a law providing exemption from military service for Yeshiva
students).
40. See generally Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Towards a Procedural Limitation Clause,
10 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL [LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL] 521 (2007) (in Hebrew,
arguing for the application of Process Theory in Israeli constitutional interpretation, and
supporting Justice Grunis’s invocation of Ely’s jurisprudence).
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